27th Amendment: A Rush to Reshape Power

By Staff Reporter

In the fractious landscape of Pakistani politics, where amendments to the Constitution often serve as proxies for deeper power struggles, the sudden emergence of plans for a 27th Amendment has set off alarms. Just months after the contentious 26th Amendment reshaped the judiciary, introducing new mechanisms for judicial appointments and establishing federal constitutional benches, the government is now pushing for further changes that could profoundly alter the balance between the center and the provinces, the military and civilians, and the executive and the judiciary.

This move, revealed publicly by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the chairman of the Pakistan Peoples Party, shows a troubling haste in constitutional tinkering at a time when the country’s democratic institutions are already under strain. The 26th Amendment, passed amid heated debate and accusations of coercion, was intended to streamline judicial processes and address backlogs in constitutional matters. Yet it quickly faced legal challenges, including petitions in the Supreme Court questioning its validity and implementation. In the Islamabad High Court, disputes over judge transfers have highlighted internal judicial discord, revealing that even reformed structures cannot fully insulate the bench from political pressures. Critics, including Maulana Fazlur Rehman of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, who initially supported the amendment but later voiced regrets over omitted safeguards, warned that it risked subordinating the judiciary to executive whims. Now, with the 27th Amendment on the horizon, those fears appear to be materialising into a broader assault on federalism and accountability. At the heart of the proposed changes is an effort to consolidate federal authority, potentially at the expense of the hard-won provincial autonomy enshrined in the 18th Amendment of 2010. That earlier reform, a landmark achievement of the PPP under Bhutto-Zardari’s late mother, Benazir Bhutto, devolved key powers like education, health and population welfare to the provinces, while enhancing their share of national resources through the National Finance Commission award. The 27th Amendment, as outlined by Bhutto-Zardari in his recent post on the X platform, would reverse some of these gains by returning education and population planning to federal control.

Proponents argue this is necessary for uniform national policies, Pakistan’s population growth, unchecked in many regions, demands coordinated action, they say, and a fragmented education system has perpetuated inequality. But such centralisation could exacerbate tensions in a federation already strained by ethnic and regional divides. Even more contentious is the proposed removal of constitutional protections for provincial shares in the NFC award, which currently guarantees a formulaic distribution of federal revenues.

This safeguard, embedded in Article 160, has long been a sore point for the central government, which contends that it leaves Islamabad with insufficient resources to manage national priorities, especially amid pressures from international lenders like the International Monetary Fund. Yet altering it risks alienating provinces, particularly Sindh and Balochistan, where nationalist sentiments run high. The PPP, traditionally a guardian of provincial rights, finds itself in a bind: supporting these changes could undermine its own legacy, yet Bhutto Zardari’s disclosure that Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif sought his party’s backing suggests negotiations are underway, possibly involving concessions like influence in Azad Kashmir’s governance.

Even more fraught are revisions to Article 243, which governs the command and control of the armed forces and currently states that the federal government “shall have control and command of the Armed Forces.” While Pakistan’s Constitution nominally places the military under civilian oversight, the country’s history of coups and interventions has often rendered that a fiction. The proposed changes would reduce the executive’s role in military appointments and command, potentially increasing the armed forces’ institutional influence. Reports indicate this could formalise the rank of Field Marshal, conferred on current Army Chief Asim Munir in May 2025, and clarify succession procedures, effectively cementing his power and extending tenures for military leaders. Such moves would entrench a system where the armed forces operate with greater autonomy. While details remain scant, any move to entrench military prerogatives further could further blur the lines of civilian supremacy, a principle that has been grossly ignored due to ongoing hybrid governance. Judicial reforms loom large as well. The amendment envisions establishing a dedicated constitutional court, building on the 26th’s benches, and modifying Article 200 to allow judge transfers without consent in certain cases.
It also proposes reviving executive magistrates, a colonial-era institution abolished by the 18th Amendment, to handle administrative disputes. These steps, while framed as efficiency measures, could effectively sideline independent judges and concentrate interpretive power in a body more amenable to federal influence.

The opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, led by Imran Khan from behind bars, has decried this as an “attack on the house,” warning that it would neuter judicial checks on executive overreach. Another flashpoint is the appointment of the chief election commissioner under Article 213. Currently requiring consultation between the government and opposition, the amendment might strip the latter of input, allowing the ruling coalition to install a pliant figure. In the wake of the disputed February 2024 elections, which saw allegations of rigging and a Supreme Court ruling reallocating reserved seats to the ruling parties, this could further erode trust in the electoral process. If elections become tools of the incumbent, the cycle of instability that has plagued Pakistan since its founding will only deepen.

With a simple majority secured after the reserved seats verdict, the coalition no longer needs Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s votes, yet efforts to court him persist, perhaps to forestall street protests alongside the PTI. Recent flare-ups over issues like proposed canals in Cholistan, which drew nationalist ire in Sindh, and murmurs of new provinces highlight the volatility of federal-provincial relations. The PPP’s muted response to the canals, contrasted with its sensitivity to Sindh’s integrity, suggests internal calculations: Is control in Azad Kashmir worth diluting the 18th Amendment’s protections? This haste betrays a deeper malaise. Pakistan’s Constitution, born in 1973 after the trauma of Bangladesh’s secession, was designed as a federal compact to bind diverse regions. Amending it piecemeal, without broad consensus, invites backlash. The 18th Amendment succeeded because it involved painstaking negotiations; the 26th, by contrast, passed under duress and now faces scrutiny. Rushing the 27th risks the same fate, or worse, a constitutional crisis that could empower extraconstitutional forces. The draft should be made public, debated in parliament and consulted with all stakeholders, including opposition parties and provincial assemblies. Only through such inclusivity can the Constitution evolve as a living document rather than a battleground for short-term gains.